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Among the oldest questions in legal philosophy are those asking
where law comes from and what makes it legitimate. Central to this
discussion is the distinction between law as a legitimate source of so-
cial ordering and law as an illegitimate demonstration of raw state
power. The purpose of this Article is not to contribute to the impor-
tant debate about what makes law legitimate or illegitimate. Rather,
the purpose of the Article is to make three observations about legal
rules that, I believe, will shed some light on the issue of the nature of
law.
The first observation is that civil societies generate both legiti-
mate and illegitimate legal rules. At first blush, it might seem that
there are two sorts of legal systems, those that generate legitimate
rules and those that generate illegitimate rules. But, while it is true
that some legal systems are clearly more legitimate than others, it is
important to recognize that even highly legitimate legal systems (such
as that of the United States) often generate legal rules that one can
only describe as illegitimate. Similarly, even an illegitimate legal sys-
t J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, and Director, John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics, Cornell Law School.
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tern (such as that of Germany during the Nazi era) will generate per-
fectly legitimate legal rules, such as the prohibition against murder.
Second, the production of legal rules by legislatures generally is
not linked to the demand for law by the relevant parties. In other
words, laws are not supplied because society legitimately needs them,
but because the outcomes that private ordering spontaneously gener-
ates often do not serve the interests of the politicians, legislatures, and
special interest groups that are uniquely able to supply law.
The final, and most important, observation made in this Article
concerns the inherent indeterminacy of efforts to categorize legal
rules as legitimate or illegitimate. In a legal system that has the trap-
pings of legitimacy and that produces both legitimate and illegitimate
legal rules, it is simply not possible, except in extreme cases, to
"prove" the legitimacy or the illegitimacy of a particular rule. The
problem is that politicians, interest groups, and bureaucrats have
strong incentives to categorize the legal rules they make as legitimate
even when they are not. Lawmakers of all stripes have an incentive to
falsely categorize illegitimate legal rules as legitimate in order to lower
the political costs to themselves of passing illegitimate rules. Although
groups that suffer from the existence of illegitimate rules may com-
plain, the groups that benefit from such rules will come to the defense
of these rules. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the groups
that defend such rules are likely to be better organized than the
groups that are harmed by such rules. The fact that, inevitably, there
will be those that complain even about legitimate rules makes the
problem even worse.
Two important consequences flow from this Article's observation
about the origin and nature of legal rules. First, the theory presented
here about the impossibility of distinguishing legitimate from illegiti-
mate legal rules suggests important roles for process and structure in
the legal system. It is possible to design a procedural system and a struc-
tural (or constitutional) system that tend to winnow out illegitimate
legal rules and to preserve legitimate legal rules even though it is im-
possible to distinguish, as a substantive matter, those rules that are
legitimate from those that are not. Specifically, as I have argued else-
where,1 certain rules of statutory interpretation, as well as other re-
quirements of procedural justice,2 tend to promote the creation of
legitimate legal rules at the expense of illegitimate rules. Other struc-
tural features of a legal system, such as the separation of powers, the
1 SeeJonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Inter-
pretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986).
2 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 156, 202 (1961) (discussing guidelines tend-
ing to preserve the integrity of the judicial process);JoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 236-
39 (1971) (listing the ideals "which laws are expected to approximate").
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independent judiciary, and the bifurcated legislature (upper and
lower houses), also serve to increase the percentage of legitimate legal
rules as a fraction of the total rules produced by a legal system. Sec-
ond, because private ordering tends to produce generally legitimate
legal rules, while public ordering produces both legitimate and illegit-
imate legal rules, there is a strong argument for a "meta-rule" that
prefers private to public ordering.
Part I of this Article discusses the concept of the legitimacy of
legal rules and the process through which both legitimate and illegiti-
mate legal rules are created. Part II of the Article discusses the supply
and demand of legal rules and explains why even legitimate legal sys-
tems create illegitimate, as, well as legitimate legal rules. This discus-
sion is followed in Part III by an explanation of why it is impossible to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate legal rules.
Parts IV and V of this Article discuss the practical consequences
of the analysis presented. In particular, they argue that merely be-
cause it is impossible to distinguish between legitimate and illegiti-
mate legal rules does not mean that nothing can be done to affect the
mix of good and bad law in society. Rather, the structural and proce-
dural rules that provide the framework for the creation and imple-
mentation of substantive legal rules can critically determine the mix
of legitimate and illegitimate laws. Part IV also contains a discussion
of private ordering. Building on the important work of Robert Ellick-
son,3 who shows that certain groups can generate private norms that
maximize the general welfare of the group,4 I conclude that the pro-
cedural and constitutional rules that structure society should reflect a
bias towards private-ordering.
I
FoRMAL AND INFORMAL LEGAL RuLEs
"But though no other nation has ever had any written whaling law,
yet the American fishermen have been their own legislators and law-
yers in this matter."5
In every society, people are governed by an extremely complex
web of formal and informal rules, norms, and constraints. This web
begins with family custom; it stretches to religious tenets, codes of pro-
fessional ethics, and standards of industry behavior, and extends all
the way to formal, substantive legal rules. All of these rules constrain
S ROBERT C. ELuCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES
(1991).
4 Id. at 167-83 (discussing a hypothesis of welfare-maximizing norms).




human action in some way, and all of them provide incentives and
disincentives for people to do various things.
Indeed, in light of the myriad sources of legal constraints on
human action, it is worth considering, at least briefly, why there is a
need for the state to supplement the rules that nongovernmental ac-
tion has already generated. Families generate legal rules in order to
solve disputes within themselves. The rules are highly customized to
the particular needs of the group. As the scope of the application of a
legal rule increases, so too does the probability that the group will
apply it in situations that are inappropriate.
Professor Ellickson identifies five factors (that he calls "control-
lers") that "may be sources of both rules of behavior and sanctions
that back up those rules."6 Those rules of self-control that emanate
from persons themselves are rules of "personal ethics."7 Those rules
that develop in the course of negotiations with others are "contrac-
tual" restrictions.8 Those rules that come from social forces are
"norms."9 Those restrictions that come from organizations are "or-
ganization rules."10 And finally, the rules that emanate from govern-
ment are laws."'
Professor Ellickson makes a powerful case for the proposition
that legal theory consistently overemphasizes the role of law.12 Over a
very wide range of human interaction, the content of the relevant
legal rules simply does not matter very much. People do not bother to
learn the underlying legal rules that affect their actions and rely in-
stead on norms and customs to govern their behavior. In his seminal
investigation of the behavior of business firms in Wisconsin, Professor
Macaulay found that informal norms of fair dealing (particularly that
"[c]ommitments are to be honored" and that "[o]ne ought to pro-
duce a good product and stand behind it") play as large a role as law
in governing firm behavior.13
Similarly, the thesis that norms are an important source of con-
straint on human action finds support in the work of Elizabeth Hoff-
man and Matthew Spitzer.14 Hoffman and Spitzer conducted a series
of experiments to see how people negotiated in a game in which they
6 ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 126.




11 Id. at 126-27.
12 Id. at 137-38, 280-81.
13 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55, 63 (1963).
14 Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experi-
mental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985).
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initially received unequal monetary entitlements. 15 They found that a
set of norms, which they described as "Lockean" ethics, governed the
conduct of most players in the two-person experiments, designed to
examine how people bargained over monetary proceeds from a
game.16
There are a variety of explanations for why informal norms de-
velop and for why law is so often irrelevant. All of these seek to ex-
plain why people cooperate and help each other, even when it may
not be in their narrow, short-term interest to do so. One explanation
is purely Darwinian: in a world of scarce resources, groups that coop-
erate for mutual gain have better survival possibilities than those that
do not. As Friedrich Hayek observed:
[W] e cannot reasonably doubt that [our aims and] these values are
created and altered by the same evolutionary forces that have pro-
duced our intelligence. All that we can know is that the ultimate
decision about what is good or bad will be made not by individual
human wisdom but by the decline of the groups that have adhered
to the "wrong" beliefs. 17
Professor Ellickson tends to doubt the explanatory power of
purely evolutionary accounts regarding the power of norms of mutual
cooperation. His doubt stems from the fact that, although honesty
and other cooperative norms might be good for groups as a whole,
"defectors," i.e., dishonest people preying off the honesty of others,
will prosper in honest communities because such dishonest people
will be "surrounded by easy marks."' 8
The problem with Professor Ellickson's analysis, in my view, is
that he falsely assumes that the honest people are "easy marks," that is,
they are unable to identify and shun the dishonest people.19 Contrary
to Ellickson's analysis, Robert Frank observes that, in fact, the inclina-
tion to keep one's promises increases one's survival possibilities. 20
Moreover, it is widely known that people teach their children to keep
their promises. If, as Professor Ellickson suggests, it were better for
the individual or family group to break promises with outsiders, then
parents would not instill in their children the norm that they should
not break their promises.2' For Professor Ellickson, a better explana-
15 Id.
16 Id. at 280-84.
17 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 36 (1960).
18 ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 152.
19 Id.
20 Robert H. Frank, IfHomo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would
He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 Am. ECON. REv. 593, 594-96 (1987).
21 See, e.g., Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16J.L. &




tion for the emergence of norms that require cooperation for mutual
gain lies in the field of game theory in general and in the existence of
repeated, or iterated, Prisoners' Dilemma games among people.22
A Prisoners' Dilemma emerges when two people are in a situation
in which they have private incentives to do something that is not in
the best interests of both people.23 The classic illustration of the Pris-
oners' Dilemma involves the situation in which two people are ac-
cused of a crime such as armed robbery.24 For our purposes, a variant
on the underlying fact pattern of the classic Prisoners' Dilemma
presented by David Hume and elaborated on by Kenneth Shepsle and
Mark Bonchek25 provides a more useful example. The story involves
two farmers who have land that borders on a common marsh. Both
farmers would benefit from the draining of the marsh, because drain-
22 ELLICKsON, supra note 3, at 156-66.
23 For a further description of the Prisoners' Dilemma, see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE &
MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING PoLrrIcs: RATIONAUTY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTrTUTIONs 201-19
(1997).
24 The prosecutor does not have enough evidence to convict either suspect without a
confession from one of them, but there is enough evidence to convict both of gun posses-
sion. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's best strategy is to separate the prisoners
and place them both in a dilemma (the Prisoners' Dilemma) by offering them each a deal
with a particular set of characteristics. Specifically, the prosecutor will tell each prisoner
that if she confesses and agrees to testify against the other prisoner, she may receive a very
light sentence of three months. However, if she does not confess (or "defect" from the
point of view of the other prisoner), and the other prisoner confesses, she will receive a
stiff sentence of nine years. If both prisoners continue to cooperate with each other and
refuse to make a deal with the prosecutor, each will receive a sentence on the gun posses-
sion charge of one year. However, if, under interrogation, both prisoners strike a bargain
with the prosecutor and defect from their plan of cooperating with each other, each will
receive a sentence for armed robbery and weapons possession of four years.
In graphic form the matrix of payoffs looks like this:
Prisoner B
do not confess confess
Prisoner A
do not confess A:lyr/B:lyr A-9yrs/B:3mos
confess A-3mos/B:9yrs A.4yrs/B:4yrs
The point of the Prisoners' Dilemma is that by isolating the two prisoners, the prose-
cutor can set up a situation where it is in the best interests of both Prisoner A and Prisoner
B to defect from their plan of mutual cooperation, even though following a strategy of coopera-
tion clearly maximizes the aggregate welfare of A and B. By cooperating and not confessing, A
and B each receive one year in prison or two years of total prison time for the two of them.
This is clearly superior, both to the eight years they will receive in aggregate if they both
confess (and each receives four years), and also to the nine years and three months they
will receive if one refuses to deal with the prosecutor (and receives nine years), while the
other talks to the prosecutor (and receives three months).
Nonetheless, the Prisoners' Dilemma suggests that both A and B will confess to the
prosecutor if they are not sure that their counterpart will remain silent. This is because
confessing to the prosecutor is the only way to avoid the worst possible outcome (nine
years in prison) and to have a chance of receiving the best possible outcome (three months
in prison). But, of course, A and B each have strong incentives to develop norms that will
insure that the other will cooperate and refuse to talk if the two are caught.
25 See SHEPSLE & BONCHEK, supra note 23, at 201-04.
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ing the marsh would destroy the resident mosquito population. But,
of course, any funds one farmer expends to drain the marsh will bene-
fit the other farmer, so each has some incentive to sit back and hope
the other farmer will do it.
Each farmer stands to receive units of value, called "utiles," from
the draining of the pond.26 As Shepsle and Bonchek present the
situation:
Suppose each of Hume's farmers valued the drained marsh at 2
utiles. If either were to take the project on by himself, the cost to
him . . . would be 3 utiles. Thus, if there were only one farmer
available to take on the task, then it certainly would not be worth his
while. Suppose, however, that if each farmer worked 'cooperatively'
with the other, then it would cost each only 1 utile. In this case
each farmer would enjoy 2 utiles worth of drained marsh at a cost of
but a single utile-a pretty good deal. Still, though, the best deal of
all would be for the marsh to be drained entirely by the other
farmer.27
As in the classic Prisoners' Dilemma, the best outcome for both
farmers collectively is to cooperate by draining the pond, while the
worst outcome is to do nothing. The payoff matrix for the two farm-
ers (measured in utiles) is depicted below:
Farmer B
Cooperate Do Not Cooperate
(drain marsh) (do not drain marsh)
Farmer A
Cooperate
(drain marsh) A:I/B:l AAl/B:2
Do Not Cooperate
(do not drain marsh) A 2/B:1 A:O/B:O
By cooperating to drain the marsh, each farmer profits by one
net utile.28 By refusing to cooperate, each farmer has no profit and
no loss. If a farmer drains the marsh, and the other does not give
assistance, the farmer performing the draining suffers a net loss of
one utile, while the farmer who does nothing gains by two net utiles.
One of the most interesting features of the game theory literature
is the observation that if the farmers have a series of repeated dealings
with one another, they will have a strong incentive to cooperate.
Where the game is iterative, the farmers will cooperate. Shepsle and
Bonchek put it nicely:
26 Id. at 202.
27 Id.
28 Each farmer has a net increase of one utile because she receives two utiles from the
draining of the marsh, but loses one utile as the cost of draining. See id. at 202.
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Most societies, however, including the one consisting of Hume's two
farmers, are more enduring. They do not usually materialize for
that one opportunity... Rather, this week it's the marsh that
needs draining, next week it's the common fence between the farm-
ers' fields that needs patching, the week after there is the two-man
job of replacing a roof on one farmer's barn, and the week after
that it's the other farmer's pond that needs to be sealed. In short,
societies consist of a series of repeated (or even continuous) en-
counters, not one-shot plays of a game.29
Robert Axelrod observed that a very likely strategy for a person in-
volved in a repeated game is what he called a tit-for-tat strategy, in
which the person will cooperate the first time she deals with someone
else.30 In subsequent interactions, she will refuse to cooperate only if
her counter-party did not reciprocate in the cooperative effort.3 '
The point of the simple game theory presented here is that ra-
tional self-interest leads to cooperative behavior under a variety of
conditions that are likely to exist in the real world.3 2 Building on the
idea that iterative, or repeat-play, Prisoners' Dilemmas provide incen-
tives for cooperation for mutual gain, Ellickson has developed a hy-
pothesis about the conditions under which welfare-maximizing norms
will emerge.3 3 Professor Ellickson cautions that societally advanta-
geous norms may not develop outside of closely knit social groups.34
A group must be closely knit in order for welfare-maximizing norms to
develop because group members must have "information about
norms and violations and also the power and enforcement opportuni-
ties needed to establish norms" in order to create sufficient incentives
to cooperate. 35
There are three problems with this analysis. First, it is not clear
from Professor Ellickson's analysis what elements cause a group to be
closely knit. The analysis is vague and circular. It is, as Professor El-
lickson himself observes, "unaviodabl[y]" vague because "social envi-
ronments are too rich to be described in terms of a few quantifiable
variables."36 Further, it is circular because a group is closely knit when
"the information pertinent to informal control circulates easily among
29 SHEPSLE & BONCHEK, supra note 23, at 207.
30 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvoLuTION OF COOPERATION 31-33 (1984).
31 See id
32 For a thoughtful analysis of incentives resulting from repeated transactions in the
business context, see Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Struc-
turalApproach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1657-77 (1996).
33 EL.ucKsoN, supra note 3, at 167-83.
34 Id. at 173, 177-78.
35 Id at 177.
36 Id. at 178.
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them,"37 while when information circulates easily among people in a
group, that group is closely knit.
A second, and more serious, problem with Professor Ellickson's
analysis is that it ignores the strong incentives parties have to reveal
information about themselves to others and to make informational
inferences to others. To return to David Hume's example of the farm-
ers and the marsh, even if the two farmers are not members of the
same close-knit group, once the farmers see that the marsh is not be-
ing drained, each has an incentive to point out to the other that she
would gain from mutual cooperation. Even though each party has an
incentive to understate the value she places on dredging the marsh, if
one party does not fully cooperate, Robert Axelrod's tit-for-tat strat-
egy38 is applicable to impose sanctions on the other party. Moreover,
if the parties are involved in a series of repeated transactions, their
incentives to lie to one another about the value they place on various
projects will diminish.
In other words, it is the iterated nature of the relationship, rather
than the closely knit nature of the parties, that leads to cooperation.
Of course, it may seem that closely knit groups cooperate better, but
this is likely due to the fact that, by definition, closely knit groups have
more interaction with one another. It is these repeated interactions,
not the closely knit nature of the groups, that lead to cooperation.
Put another way, all closely knit groups are iterative, but not all itera-
tive relationships are among members of closely knit groups. Cooper-
ation in closely knit groups is not the result of the cohesiveness of the
group, but is instead merely a consequence of repeated interactions.
The above discussion suggests a third problem with Professor El-
lickson's analysis. He fails to consider what might cause a group to
become closely knit. Game theory suggests that people will form
closely knit groups when they have an incentive. They will have such
an incentive when they have a pattern of repeated dealings that allows
them to reveal information about themselves in order to avoid enter-
ing into a pattern of escalating sanctions (tit-for-tat behavior) that will
make both parties worse off. In other words, there is no reason why
unrelated entities cannot simply decide to become closely knit when it
is in their interest. One observes this pattern of behavior among
neighbors. Two people who are not closely knit recognize immedi-
ately that becoming neighbors places them in a pattern of repeated
dealings. They begin to cooperate. They become closely knit by an
act of will.
37 Id. at 177-78.
38 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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Robert Putnam's recent analysis of social interactions and civic
traditions among a variety of regions in Italy shows that trust (what he
calls "civic community") can develop even in fairly large communi-
ties.39 Consistent with the evolutionary analysis, people in successful
societies teach their children to be cooperative in general. They do
not teach their children to cooperate only with members of their
tribe.
Perhaps more importantly, Professor Ellickson's argument that
closely knit groups are more likely to generate welfare-maximizing
norms gives rise to empirical predictions and, thus, can be tested.
"The [Ellickson] hypothesis that close-knit groups generate norms
that maximize the objective welfare of group members"40 implies that
more closely knit societies should have more welfare-maximizing
norms than do loosely knit societies. It also implies that closely knit
societies, because they have more welfare-maximizing norms, should
do better than more diverse societies. While it is somewhat difficult to
test this hypothesis because of the paucity of truly diverse societies,
even a cursory glance at the United States-the world's most diverse
society and its most successful economy-casts some doubt on Profes-
sor Ellickson's idea that only closely knit groups are likely to develop
welfare-maximizing norms.
II
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF LEGAL RuLEs
One can unpack Professor Ellickson's important contribution to
the literature on the spontaneous creation of law into four major
points. First, he points out that academics have overemphasized the
importance of formal legal rules to the detriment of spontaneously-
generated norms. In a wide variety of contexts, law is not necessary,
either to maintain social order or to promote human flourishing. 41
Second, he observes that the norms that are generated spontane-
ously in a wide variety of settings are generally welfare-enhancing; they
systematically improve the overall well-being of the members of the
societies that embrace them. There is little to no evidence of welfare-
reducing norms.42
Third, Professor Ellickson observes that there are a variety of for-
mal and informal sanctions that exist outside of the formality of law
which serve to control participant conduct.43 A pattern of gradual es-
39 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
15 (1993).
40 ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 267.
41 1& at 126-27.
42 Id. at 267-70.
43 Id. at 211-24.
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calation of force from gossip to rebuke to mild force to strong force
exists in a stunningly wide variety of social control systems, from the
lobstermen of Maine 44 to the cattlemen of Shasta County,
California.45
Finally, as discussed above, Professor Ellickson suggests that his
theory about norms may be limited to closely-knit groups. For the
reasons catalogued previously, groups generally, and not just closely
knit groups, develop norms of social control. Put another way, the
critical element in the analysis is the pattern of repeated dealings
among people, not the fact that they are closely-knit. The patterns of
repeated dealings among people in the same profession, or living in
the same area, or dealing with the same problems, cause them to be-
come closely knit when it is in their interest.
This analysis raises the question of why we need legal rules if
norms do such a good job maximizing group welfare. Professor El-
lickson himself gives three reasons for preferring law to norms, at least
in certain circumstances.46 First, Professor Ellickson asserts that spon-
taneously-generated, welfare-maximizing norms may not do an ade-
quate job of serving the ends of corrective or distributive justice.4 7
Second, Professor Ellickson worries that certain norms that increase
welfare within a group may harm people outside the group.48 Finally,
he is concerned that law is needed to establish the set of foundational
entitlements within a particular society.49
Robert Cooter, in his discussion of'the 'jurisprudence of social
norms,"50 suggests other reasons for the state's role in the enforce-
ment of norms. Because the state enforces the norm through impar-
tial courtjudgment, Professor Cooter asserts that state enforcement is
more "certain" than private efforts to coerce behavior.51 Similarly,
since the state can utilize its "monopoly on official use of force," state
enforcement is more "secure. '52 Perhaps most importantly, state en-
forcement can reduce private enforcement costs, thus "pulling in"
more private enforcement. The threat of public enforcement may
cause people to conform to norms, fearing that private individuals will
44 SeeJAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 74 (1988).
45 See ELLUCESON, supra note 3, at 40-64.
46 Id. at 283-84.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 284.
49 Id.
50 Robert D. Cooter, Law From Order, in A NoT-So-DISMAL SCIENCE: A BROADER
BRIGHTER APPROACH TO ECONOMIES AND SOCIETIES (J. Mancur Olson & S. Kahkonen eds.,
forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 38, on file with author).
51 Id. (manuscript at 39). For Professor Cooter's recommendation for norm enforce-
ment through the courts, see Cooter, supra note 32, at 1695.
52 Cooter, supra note 50 (manuscript at 39).
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seek to enforce the state-supported norm.53 Although state enforce-
ment must conform to the pre-existing social norms, "state enforce-
ment of social norms can increase private cooperation and
production."54
While these normative observations are useful in that they suggest
some reasons why legal rules should exist in a perfect, platonic world,
they provide little explanation for why legal rules actually exist as a
positive matter. Drawing on the lessons of public choice analysis, I
argue in this part of the Article that the legal rules we actually observe
are not necessarily the same as the legal rules that we might want or
need.
Public choice, or the economic theory of regulation, focuses on
the similarities between politics and markets. 55 The political world is
modeled as a brokerage system, in which politicians survive and flour-
ish in a competitive political environment by maximizing the political
support they receive. Interest groups tend to dominate the political
process. Such groups form in order to demand legislation from politi-
cians who serve as brokers between the legislation suppliers (taxpay-
ers) and the interest group coalitions who demand legislative favors.
These groups are those whose costs of organizing are less than the
value of the benefits they receive from politicians, who provide bene-
fits in the form of favorable legislation, paid for by groups that are not
as well organized. As Robert Tollison has observed,
[T] he supply of legislation is an inverse demand curve. Those who
"supply" wealth transfers are individuals who do not find it cost ef-
fective to resist having their wealth taken away. In other words, it
costs them more than one dollar to resist having one dollar taken
away. This concept of a supply curve of legislation or regulation
suggests that the costs of political activity to some individuals exceed
the potential gains (or avoided losses). The supply of legislation is,
therefore, grounded in the unorganized or relatively less-organized
members of society.56
In other words, legal rules exist, even where they are unnecessary
and inefficient, because well-organized interest groups demand them
from politicians. That is, people with similar interests, including busi-
ness interests, are likely to have patterns of repeated dealings. As Pro-
53 Id.
54 Id. (manuscript at 43). Professor Cooter elaborates on his assertion that state en-
forcement increases efficiency in his article describing the "market modemization of law."
Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16 INr'L REv. L. & EcoN. 141
(1996).
55 See ROBERT E. McCORMICK & ROBERT D. ToLLIsoN, PoLrcICIANs, LEGISLATION AND
THE ECONOMw- AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 7-12 (1981).
56 Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339, 343 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
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fessor Ellickson's work suggests, these repeated dealings cause people
to come together to work out arrangements that will increase their
joint welfare. One way that people can maximize theirjoint welfare is
to galvanize into an interest group coalition that lobbies Congress for
wealth transfers.
A good example of this process at work concerns the interaction
of the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New
York Stock Exchange. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a pri-
vate, for-profit organization that serves as a forum for people who wish
to buy and sell securities. The NYSE's success-indeed its survival in
the face of constantly increasing competition from rival trading fo-
rums-depends on its ability to attract companies to list their shares
on the Exchange, which in turn depends on investors' willingness to
engage in transactions on the NYSE. Consequently, the NYSE has a
strong incentive to develop rules that protect investors. For this rea-
son, even prior to the passage of the securities laws, NYSE member
firms (and also firms belonging to certain other stock exchanges)
"had to submit balance sheets and income statements to the Ex-
change" and subject themselves to audits by independent
accountants. 57
As a result of this analysis, one might wonder why Congress
passed the mandatory disclosure laws in 1933 and 1934, which basi-
cally codified the pre-existing rules of conduct applied to NYSE mem-
ber firms. George Benston made this point and an additional point:
One could also argue that the disclosure policy followed by corpora-
dons in the absence of legislation is in the best interests of their
stockholders. If management believed that the marginal revenue to
the stockholders as a group from disclosure would exceed the mar-
ginal cost of preparing and supplying the information, they would
disclose their financial and other data.58
In other words, the practical effect of the securities laws was to
extend to unlisted firms the disclosure requirements, which organized
57 GeorgeJ. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 132, 133 (1973).
58 Id. at 133-34. Professor Benston goes on to describe the costs and benefits as
follows:
The marginal revenue might include the savings to stockholders of not hav-
ing to gather the data privately, the reduced cost of capital to the firm if
prospective stockholders' uncertainty about the firm were reduced, im-
provement in the marketability of the firms' shares if investors desired fi-
nancial information, etc. The marginal costs of disclosure might include
the cost of preparing and distributing the statements, the costs incurred in
informing competitors, suppliers, customers, and government officials, and
the cost of misinforming stockholders when accounting statements report
economic events incorrectly or inadequately (as when all research and de-




exchanges, such as the NYSE, already imposed on member firms.
These unlisted firms tended to be smaller, and for them, unlike for
larger firms, a cost-benefit calculation of the kind Professor Benston
described would likely result in a rational decision not to disclose the
kind of information that the SEC required because the benefits (in
terms of lower borrowing costs) would not be worth the costs.
The new SEC requirements deprived many firms' access to the
public capital markets because the costs of going public increased due
to the new disclosure burdens. As George Stigler observed, "many
more new companies used the market in the 1920's than in the
1950's-from one viewpoint a major effect of the S.E.C. was to ex-
clude new companies."59 Holding levels of capital constant, the re-
duction in competition benefited the larger (more politically
powerful) firms that were NYSE members.
What is interesting about the story of the SEC's mandatory disclo-
sure rules is that it shows not only that group norms (here the norms
of the NYSE) maximize the joint welfare of group members, but also
that extending these rules beyond the relevant group can cause signif-
icant harm. Moreover, this anecdote also illustrates the public choice
theory prediction that there will be a strong demand for legal rules
even where the norms generated by private ordering are producing
enviable results.60
The above example was not intended to suggest that government
action produces all harms and no corresponding benefits. After all,
the government-mandated disclosure of information by all firms wish-
ing to make a public offering of securities has benefits. The problem
is that the costs probably outweigh the benefits, particularly when one
considers that, of the many small companies that lost access to the
public capital markets, some might have been wildly successful. Nor
was the point of the above example that the net costs of all govern-
ment programs outweigh the net benefits. This is clearly not the case.
Rather, the point is that government action involves costs as well as
benefits, and that, due to the interest-group nature of the political
process, the costs often outweigh the benefits.
However, it is still important to stress that the benefits of some
government programs outweigh the costs. For example, government
programs that protect property rights,6 1 or that invigorate informal
control so that people can obtain order without law,62 or that produce
59 GeorgeJ. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37J. Bus. 117, 122 (1964).
60 For an excellent description of the institution of strong legal rules in the anti-dis-
crimination context, where private norms would suffice largely on their own, see Robert
Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 133 (1994).
61 See MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 55, at 4.
62 See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 284-86.
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public goods under certain limited conditions,63 all suggest a useful
role for government. The legislature produces bad laws to appease
interest-group coalitions, which trade political support for favorable
legislation. The legislature produces good laws for the same reason-
sometimes the laws interest-group coalitions demand happen to coin-
cide with the public interest. Law coincides with the public interest
where the law that produces the greatest political support for legisla-
tors also produces the greatest welfare for society.
Law will also tend to coincide more with the public interest where
there are close substitutes for existing rulers:
The ruler always has rivals: competing states, or potential rulers
within his own state.... Where there are no close substitutes, an
existing ruler will be characterized as a despot, a dictator, or an ab-
solute monarch. The closer 1he substitutes, the fewer degrees of
freedom the ruler possesses, and the greater the percentage of in-
cremental income that will be retained by the constituents.r 4
Similarly, where the information and transaction costs of displacing
incumbent leaders is low, as in multi-party democracies with strong
protections for freedom of the press and low information costs of dis-
placing existing rulers, the economy will tend to grow faster than
where despotic leadership and few civil liberties exist.65
III
TI SuBjEcrivE INDETERMINACY OF LEGAL RuLEs
An implication of the above analysis is that politicians, bureau-
crats, and interest groups have a strong incentive to disguise their
rent-seeking activities.66 Interest groups are only able to use the gov-
ernment to obtain wealth transfers from society as a whole because
the information and transaction costs to private citizens of discovering
and eliminating rent-seeking by interest groups are prohibitively ex-
pensive. Put another way, people suffer from the collective action
problems of rational ignorance and free-riding.
63 It is wrong to assert, as Pigou did, that government intervention is warranted to
cure market failure. A.C. PGou, THE ECONOMIcs OF WELFARE (1932). Rather, government
intervention is warranted only where the benefits outweigh the costs, taking into account
the possibility of using nongovernmental alternatives. In situations where private arrange-
ments are likely to fail, and where the supposed "beneficiaries" of the relevant legislation
can monitor at low cost the performance of governmental actors, there may be a case for
governmental action.
64 Douglass C. North, A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History, 16 EXPLO-
RATIONS ECON. HisT. 249, 255 (1979).
65 See Thomas R. Lansner, Out of Africa, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1996, at A22; Enrico
Colombatto &Jonathan Macey, Information and Transaction Costs as the Determinants of
Tolerable Growth Levels (Dec. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
66 See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING 39 (1997).
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Rational ignorance refers to the fact that it simply is not rational
for someone to spend more that $100 in order to discover and stop a
piece of legislation that is only going to impose a cost of $90 on that
person. That is why interest-group oriented wealth transfers tend to
involve concentrated benefits and diffuse costs.
Free-riding refers to the fact that, because the rewards of legisla-
tion benefiting the general public are spread among everyone in the
population, individual members of the public lack sufficient incen-
tives to promote public interest laws because the promoters them-
selves must absorb all of the promotion costs. Hence the enacted laws
will tend to benefit whichever small, cohesive special interest groups
lobby most effectively, because such small, cohesive groups can more
easily resolve their free-rider problems.67 As Richard Posner has ob-
served, "the fewer the prospective beneficiaries of a regulation, the
easier it will be for them to coordinate their efforts to obtain the regu-
lation. '68 For example, milk price supports harm everybody who buys
milk. The small, cohesive lobby of milk producers nonetheless is able
to obtain these subsidies because the stakes are so small that it is not
worth it for individual consumers to complain. 69
Because politicians must maximize their political support to stay
in office, they have an incentive to search for issues in which the win-
ners (special interest groups) are easily identified, while it is difficult
to identify the losers (the general polity).70 By masking the true pur-
pose of a statute and claiming that it is actually in the public interest,
legislators and interest groups lower the costs of passing statutes that
transfer wealth to themselves. That is why, whenever a new law is
passed, "the question whether the legislative action has a public pur-
pose is always one that the legislature purports to have decided
affirmatively."71
As Mancur Olson has observed, passage of costly legislation to
protect the professions by erecting inefficient barriers to entry has
been facilitated by the "susceptibility of the public to the assertion that
a professional organization... ought to be able to determine who is
'qualified' to practice the profession. ' 72 And as I have observed in
another context:
67 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAG-
FLATION, AND SocIAL- RIGIDITIES 18, 41 (1982).
68 Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMTr. ScI. 335,
345 (1974).
69 See 7 U.S.C. § 1446(c)-(d) (1994) (authorizing milk price supports).
70 See MCCORMICK & TOLLISON, supra note 55, at 17.
71 Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulaton: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54 TUL.
L. REV. 849, 868 (1980).
72 OLSON, supra note 67, at 35.
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Where it is difficult to discern the nature of the wealth transfer em-
bodied in a particular statute, loss of public support will be a small
part of a legislator's cost calculation. Interest groups and politicians
have incentives to engage in activities that make it more difficult for
the public to discover the special interest group nature of legisla-
tion. This often is accomplished by the subterfuge of masking spe-
cial interest legislation with a public interest facade. To the extent
that this can be carried out successfully, the political costs to legisla-
tors of enacting special interest legislation will decline. 73
The point here, of course, is that it is impossible to rely on a
legislature's own pronouncements, either in the text of statutes them-
selves or in legislative history, in order to differentiate legitimate, pub-
lic-regarding legislative enactments from illegitimate, amorally
redistributive wealth transfers.74
Indeed, public choice theory suggests that the legislature itself
may not even know the social welfare consequences of the statutes it
passes. After all, according to public choice theory, well-organized in-
terest group coalitions influence the political process through cam-
paign contributions, honoraria for speaking engagements, outright
bribes, and other forms of political support.75 Special-interest groups
can influence even the most honest, well-meaning Congressman. Due
to the rational interest and free-rider problems, poorly organized
members of the general public have limited incentives to inform
themselves-and, consequently, their elected officials-of the conse-
quences of most legislation. The same free-rider and rational igno-
rance problems plague individual congressmen and limit their
accumulation of information.
Over a wide range of issues, interest groups can shape the out-
comes the legislative process generates simply because they control
the flow of information to legislators on particular issues. This control
of information, particularly regarding complex issues, enables interest
groups to "distort congressmen's thinking on an issue-normally all
an interest group needs to achieve its ends."76
In other words, the information and transaction costs involved in
obtaining and using information about legislative issues results in the
passage of special interest legislation by legislators who really believe
they are acting in the public interest. The fact that all legislation, by
definition, has some supporters heightens the problem. Preferences
73 Macey, supra note 1, at 232 (footnote omitted).
74 Judge Posner coined the term "amorally redistributive." Richard A. Posner, Eco-
nomics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 268
(1982).
75 See Gregg Easterbrook, What's Wrong With Congress7, ATANTc MONTHLY, Dec. 1984,
at 57, 70-72.
76 Id. at 70.
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differ, and even reasonable, well-informed people will disagree over
the value of some legal rules.
Moreover, the same organizational advantages that enable inter-
est groups to shape Congress's preferences on issues also enable such
groups to shape public opinion through the use of advertising and
public relations, and to shape judicial opinion through the use of
lawyers.
For all of these reasons, even legitimate legal systems create ille-
gitimate as well as legitimate legal rules. On their face, it is simply
impossible to distinguish the legitimate legal rules from the illegiti-
mate ones. Any attempt by judges to do so is likely to result in mis-
takes of over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness. Mistakes of over-
inclusiveness occur when judges mistakenly strike down welfare-en-
hancing statutes. Mistakes of under-inclusiveness occur when judges
mistakenly uphold welfare-reducing statutes.
Proponents of judicial activism are simply those who prefer mis-
takes of judicial over-inclusiveness to mistakes ofjudicial under-inclu-
siveness. Proponents of judicial restraint simply prefer mistakes of
judicial under-inclusiveness to mistakes of judicial over-inclusiveness.
IV
JUSTIFYING A PREFERENCE FOR PRIVATE ORDERING
The above discussion suggests a strong basis for preferring private
ordering in the form of informal social controls developed through
norms to formal legal rules, even in legitimate, democratic regimes:
private ordering generates substantive legal principles that are supe-
rior to those that the state produces.
Generally, private ordering is justified because it provides a more
efficient allocation of capital and labor than central planning. The
major lesson provided by the collapse of socialism in the former Soviet
Union and elsewhere is that, in the information age, socialism cannot
generate enough wealth to maintain a sufficient level of political and
social support for incumbent politicians. 77 Moreover, because infor-
mal norms generate outcomes that are generally welfare-enhancing,
while law at best generates outcomes that are mixed (and tend strongly
towards the welfare-reducing), informal norms should come with a
strong presumption of legitimacy. Formal legal rules are likely to be
inefficient at best and amorally redistributive at worst. Thus, under a
wide range of circumstances, such as when society is interested in
maximizing utilitarian considerations, and when society is interested
in resolving standard legal disputes within groups, lawmakers are un-
77 See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 65, at 20.
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likely to improve upon the customary rules the group develops
through voluntary, private interaction. 78
In the wake of Professor Ellickson's analysis, together with the
public-choice critique of public law presented here, the only serious
objections to the idea that private ordering is superior to public order-
ing are: (1) private ordering will not give sufficient weight to redis-
tributive concerns, and (2) private ordering will not alter the initial
entitlements that people have even though these initial entitlements
may be. unjust.
In analyzing these objections to the system of private ordering, it
is important to realize that the relevant question is not whether private
ordering achieves what could be regarded as perfectly just redistribu-
tive outcomes. Rather, in deciding whether to allocate responsibility
for redistribution to private ordering, the relevant question is whether
private ordering reaches a result that is superior to the result public
ordering reaches.79
The answer to this question is by no means clear, but three points
are relevant in thinking about the issue. First, just as much legal
scholarship tends to overemphasize the role of law0 as a substitute for
norms qua a mechanism of social ordering, so too does legal scholar-
ship systematically tend to underestimate the extent to which the pri-
vate sector can accomplish wealth redistribution successfully. For
example, social-science experimentation shows that people tend to
share equally the gross proceeds received in bargaining games.81 Im-
portantly, people's norms about sharing often cause them to make
redistibutions where they think that initial distributions of property
rights are unfair.82 This evidence strongly suggests that private order-
ing does give weight to redistributive concerns and that private order-
ing alters the initial entitlements that people have where such initial
entitlements are not thought to be just.
Moreover, not only are people charitable, but private efforts to
help the neediest in society, in fact, "have been much more successful
than the federal government's failed attempt at charity."83 Private
charities are far more flexible than public charity, and can therefore
tailor their approaches to the individual circumstances of the people
they are trying to help in ways that government cannot. Government
can demand reciprocal promises from aid recipients where appropri-
ate. The government can terminate benefits after a particular period,
78 See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 283.
79 Professor Ellickson appears to miss this point. Id. at 283-84.
80 See id. at 280-81.
81 See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 14, at 275-84.
82 See id.




but requirements that people actively search for work are difficult or
impossible for the government to monitor. It is even more difficult
for the government to monitor requirements that welfare recipients
remain in school or seek alcohol or drug counseling as a requirement
for obtaining benefits. Conversely, different private charities are
bound to offer a variety of approaches to social problems, and can
therefore differentiate between the needs of various participants far
better than government programs. 84 Private charities also can have
more flexible eligibility criteria, thus making them better able to help
those truly in need:
Because eligibility requirements for government welfare programs
are arbitrary and cannot be changed to fit individual circumstances,
many people in genuine need do not receive assistance, while bene-
fits often go to people who do not really need them. More than 40
percent of all families living below the poverty level receive no gov-
ernment assistance. Yet more than half of the families receiving
means-tested benefits are not poor. Thus a student may receive
food stamps, while a homeless man with no mailing address goes
without. Private charities are not bound by such bureaucratic
restrictions. 85
Finally, private charity is superior to government charity because it is
more efficient. Today, less than one-third of every dollar allocated to
state and federal welfare programs actually reaches recipients.8 6 Pri-
vate charities do much better.87
Second, it should be emphasized that the public sector has failed
to accomplish redistribution. In fact, with the recent efforts to reform
health care, recognition has come that the massive welfare state er-
ected in the United States over the past sixty years has made things
worse, not better, by creating a huge welfare bureaucracy with a large
stake in perpetuating itself,88 and by creating programs that provide
people with perverse incentives to make under-investments in human
capital in order to keep themselves eligible for welfare.8 9 "[T] here
are more than 77 overlapping federal anti-poverty programs, includ-
ing 59 major means-tested programs."90 If people became wealthy,
these bureaucracies would go out of business. For these reasons, it is
84 See i& at 135.
85 Id. at 136.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 136-37.
88 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUR._AUcRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1971) (arguing that bureaucrats maximize their budget); GEORGE ROCHE, AMERICA BY THE
THROAT: THE STRANGLEHOLD OF FEDERAL Bu.AucRAcy 18 (1983) (discussing the recent
"titanic expansion of bureaucratic power" and its effects); cf LUDWIG VON MIsEs, BuPAu-
cRAcv 18 (1994) (addressing the implications and consequences of bureaucratization).
89 See TANNER, supra note 83, at 86-90.
90 Id. at 62.
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not surprising that there is no correlation between the poverty rate
and the level of welfare spending: the poverty rate has stayed roughly
constant for the past 25 years (in fact, it is slightly higher now than it
was in 1965), while welfare spending has increased at an almost con-
stant rate. 91
In sum, we ought not lose the lessons of public choice on those
considering the ability of the state to affect redistributive justice.
Whatever redistributions take place in the public sector are going to
benefit those with the resources and organizational acumen to galva-
nize themselves into effective political coalitions to lobby for wealth
transfers in the name of redistribution. The benefits will flow to nar-
row special-interest groups and will be paid for by widely diffuse inter-
ests that are rationally ignorant about the consequences of the
legislation. In other words, "welfare" is likely to benefit the middle-
class at the expense of the truly needy. Moreover, because it is so
costly to monitor the effects of redistributive programs, such programs
are especially likely to become a true playground for rent-seeking. In
other words, the public sector's track record in dealing with redistrib-
utive issues is very long and extremely undistinguished.
Finally, scholars are increasingly recognizing the extent to which
public sector programs crowd out private sector initiatives. 92 In partic-
ular, Michael Taylor has shown that state provision of social insurance
displaces rather than supplements private mutual aid, and tends to
destroy the altruistic norms that people have developed over very long
periods of time. 93
V
PROCEDURAL AND STrRucTuRAL FILTERS AGAINST
ILLEGrMATE LAWS
The following discussion considers how to move the production
of legal rules towards an equilibrium that provides more space for pri-
vate ordering. While it is impossible to distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate legal rules, it does not automatically follow that noth-
ing can be done to affect the mix of good and bad law in society.
Procedural norms and rules of constitutional structure provide a pos-
sible basis for the creation and implementation of substantive legal
rules that will move the mix of legitimate and illegitimate laws in a
socially beneficial direction.
91 See ROBERT RECTOR & WILLIAM LAUBER, AMERICA'S FAILED $5.4 TRILLION WAR ON
POVERTY 92-93 tbl.1 (1995).
92 See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 196-99 (1980);
P. KROPOTKIN, MUTruAL AID: A FACTOR OF EVOLUTION 227-28 (1903); TANNER, supra note 83,
at 145 n.51; MICiHAEL TAYLOR, ANARCHY AND COOPERATION 134-40 (1976).
93 TAYLOR, supra note 92, at 134-40.
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A. Constitutional Rules and the Mix of Good and Bad Law
The above analysis has identified two sources of legal rules. First,
in a wide variety of contexts, norms, customs, and patterns of repeated
dealings provide a reliable set of welfare-enhancing rules. Second,
and less happily, discrete, well-organized interest groups enact laws
that transfer wealth to themselves from other less organized groups
(including the "general public" broadly construed). Sometimes these
special-interest group laws are desirable, but more often they are not.
Special interest group legislation is undesirable because
economic actors expend vast amounts of resources to obtain rent-
seeking legislation, to comply with it, to avoid having to comply with
it, to adjust to it, and to prevent it from being enacted in the first
place. All of this activity is dealt with thoroughly-at a descriptive
level-in the existing public choice literature. Perhaps it is best
summarized by Mancur Olson's description of three implications of
the interest group model of political behavior. First, "special inter-
est organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate in-
come in the societies in which they operate and make political life
more divisive." Second, interest group coalitions organized to effect
wealth transfers "slow down a society's capacity to adopt new tech-
nologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing condi-
tions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic growth." Finally,
distributional coalitions increase "the complexity of regulation, the
role of government and the complexity of understandings," thereby
retarding the social evolution of a society and raising the costs of all
forms of economic activity.94
However, constitutional laws emanate from a different source
than ordinary laws. Constitutional laws, which establish the institu-
tions of government and provide the ground rules for making the
other laws that govern society, grow not out of long-term customary
dealings, but out of episodic negotiation processes. More impor-
tantly, the incentive structure that characterizes ordinary lawmaking is
different during times of constitutional creation. This is because rent-
seeking is a negative-sum game. People, even those belonging to pow-
erful interest groups, generally lose more than they gain from the
rent-seeking activity that characterizes ordinary politics.
A simple example illustrates the point. In times of ordinary poli-
tics, it will benefit an interest group to spend $60 in order to obtain
$100 in wealth transfers. Even in the unlikely event that the group
making the $100 wealth transfer has spent nothing to try to block the
wealth transfer, this transfer activity constitutes a negative-sum game.
94 Jonathan R_ Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 479-80 (1988) (quoting
OLSON, supra note 67, at 74).
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One group has lost $100 (i.e., the amount of the wealth transfer), and
one group has lost $60 (i.e., the amount spent to obtain the wealth
transfer); however, the gains have been only $100 (i.e., the amount
received in the wealth transfer). Under these conditions, both sides
can benefit by bargaining to prevent this sort of rent-seeking activity.
The rent-seekers have benefited by a total of $40 ($100-$60), and the
public has lost a total of $100. By bargaining ex ante to create a set of
constitutional rules that constrain rent-seeking, both groups can make
themselves better off. The rent-seekers can, for example, receive
some amount greater than $40 but less than $100 to agree to refrain
from rent-seeking. As I have explained in another context:
By agreeing ex ante (i.e., at the time of constitutional creation) to
constrain rent-seeking, everyone can be made better off, because
even those few who expect to be net winners from the wealth trans-
fer game can be induced through side payments to support a consti-
tutional structure that restricts coercive, inefficient wealth transfers.
Thus, the interest group dynamic during times of constitutional cre-
ation may be completely different than during times of ordinary
politics-when wealth transfers dominate the political landscape. 95
In other words, because special-interest legislation adversely affects
the public, it has a strong incentive to devise institutional arrange-
ments-constitutions-that make the passage of such legislation more
difficult.
One way to make the passage of interest-group legislation more
difficult is to establish several independent branches of government,
and to permit each one to block or impede the enactments of other
branches. The executive veto and the independent judiciary are both
examples of how a constitutional separation of powers impedes the
passage of special-interest legislation.96
Of course, the separation of powers doctrine also impedes the
passage of public-regarding legislation. However, the costs generally
are considered to be less than the benefits because, by hypothesis,
there will be less opposition to public-interest legislation than to spe-
cial-interest legislation. Consequently, public-interest legislation will
be able to clear the gauntlet of constitutional checks and balances of
which the separation of powers is a part.97
Moreover, there is the opportunity to create constitutional and
procedural rules that protect and foster private ordering. Much of
the welfare-enhancing tendencies of private norms will serve the pub-
95 Id. at 481.
96 SeeTHE FEDERAIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the value of the exec-
utive veto); THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (The New American
Library of World Literature, Inc. 1961) (describing the value of judicial review).
97 See, e.g., Macey, supra note 1, at 247-50 (discussing ways in which the structure of
the Constitution impedes rent-seeking by interest groups).
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lic interest. Thus the fact that separation of powers or other checks
may somewhat impede the passage of public-regarding legislation is of
less consequence. Conversely, the private sector cannot so easily cir-
cumvent the barriers to special-interest legislation. Because private
groups lack coercive force, they are essentially powerless to transfer
wealth when blocked from employing the legislature on their behalf.
Rational actors in the private order will enter into only mutually bene-
ficial agreements. Procedural and structural systems, therefore, act as
an effective complement to a system with the goal of maximizing pri-
vate ordering.
B. Procedural Rules and the Mix of Good and Bad Law
An interesting and largely unexplored area in which broadly-held
societal norms are closely linked with legal rules is in the area of pro-
cess. In general, rules of procedure are considered to be arcane and
complex, while norms are considered to be accessible and easily sum-
marized. In fact, there is substantial overlap between rules of proce-
dure and generally-accepted norms of conduct.
Basic procedural ideas-of fairness, of treating like cases alike,
and of deciding contested issues on the basis of neutral principles-
are embraced in school yards as well as in textbooks on procedure.
The same holds true even for relatively complex procedural ideas, like
the requirement of exhausting internal, procedural remedies before
turning to outside legal sources for help. This procedural rule is
analogous to the commonplace norm that people should at least try
and work out their own problems in private before resorting to other
remedies.
Our intuitions about fairness derive from our norms about what
is right and wrong, not only substantively, but also as a matter of pro-
cess. We should view with suspicion those procedural rules that are
inconsistent with our basic intuitions about fairness because it is also
the case that procedural rules are promulgated in order to tilt the
balance of power in law formation towards interest groups.
Similarly, as a matter of process, there is a reasonably strong
norm against complexity. Simple rules, all else equal, are considered
superior to complex ones. Grant Gilmore captured this sentiment
perfectly in his classic book, The Ages of American Law: "In Heaven
there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the lamb.... In
Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticu-
lously observed."98 As Dwight Lee pointed out, erecting a costly pro-
cedural infrastructure in order to implement legislation often will
have the effect of transforming even the most public-spirited program
98 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERCAN LAW 111 (1977).
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into an interest-group cesspool. Lee used the example of legislation
designed to protect the environment:
[A]fter an individual makes a[n] ... expression of support for envi-
ronmental protection at the polls, much remains to be done if the
environment is to be protected adequately. It is unfortunately costly
for an individual to express concern for environmental quality by
lobbying for the most efficient environmental protection programs
and by monitoring those who implement these programs. Predict-
ably [due to collective action problems] there is little genuine pub-
lic surveillance of environmental protection programs, and
organized groups have significant latitude to influence environmen-
tal programs in ways that serve their private interests.99
Similarly, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast maintained that the
procedural rules established to implement a particular law will be
designed to solve the contracting problem that exists between interest
groups and politicians.100 More precisely, this contracting problem
takes the form of a nonsimultaneity of performance problem. The
problem is that the politicians and interest groups who create admin-
istrative agencies and design administrative procedures are aware that
after agencies begin operating, it will be difficult for the creators to
monitor the agencies' performance. This occurs because the agency
will develop its own agenda, and because the politicians and interest
groups themselves may lose power later and therefore be less capable
of controlling the bureaucrats within the agencies they have created.
Congress can require agencies to give interest groups and politi-
cians certain procedural and structural advantages in the administra-
tive process. This will ensure that the relevant administrative agencies
in charge of implementing these interest-group bargains will observe
the terms of the bargain struck with the interest group. 01 These rule
structures are likely to be exceedingly complex.
CONCLUSION
This Article combines the observation that norms are an impor-
tant source of legal rules with the normative framework that the pub-
lic choice literature provides to make some observations about the
nature and sources of law. The Article is premised on the assumption
that law can serve both as a legitimate source of social ordering, and
99 Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191, 196-
97 (1988).
100 Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
tro4 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 261-63 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75
VA. L. REv. 431, 440-44 (1989).
101 See Jonathan R Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 93 (1992).
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as an illegitimate forum for amoral wealth redistribution through the
exercise of raw state power.
This Article recognizes the impressive power of private parties to
successfully order their own interactions through the creation of in-
formal norms of conduct. It also recognizes that legal rules are the
product of a market-based process through which politicians attempt
to maximize their aggregate political support by supplying legal rules
to interest groups in exchange for such political support. Combining
these two observations leads to the following realization: outcomes
generated by private ordering do not always serve the interests of the
politicians, legislatures, and special-interest groups that are uniquely
able to supply the law. Therefore, in order to serve their own inter-
ests, these suppliers of the law will sometimes create laws that are not
legitimately needed.
Perhaps the most important observation this Article makes con-
cerns the inherent indeterminacy of efforts to categorize legal rules as
legitimate or illegitimate. Politicians and interest groups work to-
gether to pass laws that are illegitimate, though clouded by the rheto-
ric of the public interest. Lawmakers will categorize illegitimate legal
rules as legitimate in order simultaneously to lower the political costs
of their activity, while maximizing the gain available from the rent-
seeking of interest groups. Illegitimate rules are even more difficult
to discern because opposition to such rules is often not economically
rational, while those groups hoping to benefit from such rules have a
positive economic incentive to defend such rules to obtain wealth
transfers.
Because of the inability to distinguish between legitimate and ille-
gitimate rules, an important role exists for process and structure in
any legal system. Process and structure can eliminate some of the op-
portunities to establish illegitimate rules, lessening the importance of
identifying the legitimacy or illegitimacy of existing rules. The goal of
those organizing a legal order with procedural rules and structural, or
constitutional, rules is to create an initial filter to block the flow of as
many attempts at establishing illegitimate rules as possible.
Given that private ordering tends to produce legitimate legal
rules, while public ordering produces a mixture of legitimate and ille-
gitimate legal rules that tends towards the production of illegitimate
rules, there is a strong argument for a "meta-rule" that creates a strong
presumption in favor of private ordering over public ordering.
Despite the seemingly depressing nature of the public choice par-
adigm, which posits that politicians must seek payments in the form of
honoraria, campaign contributions, indirect political support, and
even outright bribes to survive in a Darwinian political environment,
there is still some hope for a process of rule creation that generates
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public-regarding law. The impossibility of distinguishing between le-
gitimate and illegitimate legal rules does not mean that we cannot do
anything to affect the mix of good and bad law in society. Rather, the
constitutional and procedural rules that provide boundaries for the
creation and implementation of the substantive legal rules that guide
our conduct can critically affect the quality of such substantive rules.
